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Within the broad context of EU Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border health threats, the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has initiated a case study project to investigate the synergies 
between communities affected by serious public health threats and the institutions (both health- and non-health-
related) that are mandated to prepare for and respond to them. The premise for the project is that affected 
communities are increasingly being recognised as key resources that can be used during public health 
emergencies, and that the concerns, understanding and experience of ordinary people should be harnessed as an 
important part of the response. 
The aim of this case study project is to identify good practices related to community preparedness for tick-borne diseases. 
This report focuses on two cases of Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) that emerged in Spain in August–
September 2016, the first autochthonous clinical cases of CCHF in south-western Europe. Specifically, the study aims: 
• to identify good practices and patterns of cooperation between affected communities and the official 
institutions mandated to address tick-borne diseases such as CCHF;  
• to identify inter-sectoral collaboration between health and non-health-related sectors with regard to tick-
borne diseases, such as CCHF; 
• to identify actions that could be taken by other EU countries.  
Methods 
A case study approach was taken for this project, based on three qualitative sources of evidence: documents; interviews 
with a range of technical experts working at national and autonomous community level; and focus group discussions with 
community representatives. The latter included people at risk of tick bites (such as hunters, farmers, hikers, 
veterinarians, and national park workers) and people at risk of nosocomial transmission in healthcare settings. Nine 
interviews involving a total of 13 individual experts (some interviews included two people) and three focus group 
discussions involving a total of 15 people were conducted during a visit to Spain by the research team 13–17 November 
2017. The data were subjected to thematic analysis in NVivo software and within the framework of a theoretical 
preparedness cycle that includes the pre-incident, incident, and post-incident phases.  
Findings 
The two CCHF cases 
The index case was an adult male who had been hiking on 14 August 2016 in Ávila province, Castilla y León 
Autonomous Community (AC), which is where he most likely became infected through contact with a tick. He fell ill 
on 16 August and was admitted to hospital on 18 August in Madrid; he died on 25 August. Since he died without a 
diagnosis of CCHF, (the disease had not been reported in Spain before and the infected man did not have a travel 
history to endemic areas), no specific infection control measures were taken, beyond standard procedures, to 
protect the family members, health workers and laboratory technicians with whom he or his biological samples 
could have had contact prior to his death. 
The second CCHF case was a female health worker who had taken care of the index case while he was in the 
intensive care unit between 19 and 23 August 2016. She developed symptoms herself on 27 August, recognised 
that she had the same condition as the index case, and was diagnosed on 31 August, the same day that as the 
retrospective diagnosis of the index case. She survived and was released from hospital in good health on 19 
September 2016. 
Pre-incident phase 
The primary stakeholders who were prepared for a zoonotic public health event – even if they were not prepared 
specifically for CCHF – included the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equity, the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
public health authorities in the two affected Autonomous Communities and the Autonomous Community 
veterinarians (who provided the main link to the community at risk of tick bites). Links between these four sets of 
stakeholders were well-established and built on clearly defined protocols, and this also applied to health workers at 
risk of potential nosocomial infection. By contrast, pre-existing links and synergies between the authorities and the 
community at risk of tick bites were limited to contacts with hunters and farmers through the veterinarians. 
Protocols and standard operating procedures did not exist in Spain specifically for CCHF before the occurrence of 
the two cases. However, the country had experience of both imported and autochthonous cases of Ebola during 
2014–15, so protocols for dealing with viral haemorrhagic fevers were available and widely known within the health 
sector.  
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Incident phase 
A degree of confusion during the first 48 hours after the two CCHF diagnoses led to failures in the information 
exchange system that had been set up in advance between the Ministry of Health, the public health authorities and 
communications teams in the two affected Autonomous Communities, and health workers. Some technical experts 
were informed of the incident by journalists before official channels communicated with them, and operational 
teams in at least one of the Autonomous Communities also found it necessary to communicate via an unofficial, 
parallel system during this early stage. However, once the facts became clearer, the communications protocols 
were properly implemented throughout the rest of the incident phase.  
Contact follow-up was successfully conducted, with quite different approaches in the two affected communities. 
The 400 health workers and laboratory technicians in Madrid Autonomous Community who had potentially had 
contact with the index case or his biological samples were, by definition, connected to the health system, which 
meant that the follow-up process could be managed through professional channels. Following up the six family 
member contacts in Castilla y León Autonomous Community required a more personal and strongly collaborative 
approach.  
The flow of information regarding the incident to the wider community through the media was managed in 
accordance with protocols that had been developed based on lessons learned during the Ebola crisis in 2014–15, 
when both imported and autochthonous cases were hospitalised in Madrid. Key principles included predictability in 
the timing of information release, transparency about what was known and not known, use of recognised and 
respected spokespersons, and working on the basis of a mutually trusting relationship between communications 
teams and individual journalists. Some effort was made by the authorities to monitor social media to gain a good 
understanding of community perceptions of the incident – these efforts detected no significant concerns.  
Most media coverage occurred during the first week after the initial CCHF diagnosis, and it was, for the most part, 
factual and accurate, reflecting the regular information updates received from the authorities. The community was 
advised through these updates to be alert but not alarmed, and this advice was followed by most people. There 
was a slight increase in the numbers presenting to their doctors to have ticks removed, but only 41 calls were 
logged to a CCHF hotline run by Madrid Autonomous Community over a period of 31 days, indicating a low level of 
concern in the wider population. This relatively limited concern extended to people living in Castilla y León who 
were potentially at risk of bites from CCHF-infected ticks. The main preoccupation in the village from which the 
index case originated was not the risk of infection, but rather the media intrusion in the days immediately after the 
diagnosis. For many people in this area, ticks are a regular part of life, and they have extensive experience of being 
bitten, as well as a good knowledge of preventive practices. 
Somewhat more concern was expressed among potentially at-risk health workers who, in one of the Autonomous 
Communities, were worried about the level of protection available to them should they encounter a CCHF case. A 
new protocol was swiftly developed by the Autonomous Community authorities to address this concern, which 
reflects both the capacity of the health workers to stand up for their right to be protected, and the willingness of 
the authorities to listen to their employees’ concerns. However, it is important to note fact that the authorities were 
also reportedly worried about legal and insurance issues, as well as union pressure, which would probably also 
have played a role in their decision to revise the protocol. Therefore, although there was a synergistic, bi-
directional relationship, the motivation on both sides could have been partially due to the need for self-protection. 
Post-incident phase 
No formal evaluation or overall post-incident review was conducted after the CCHF cases. This systemic 
shortcoming was ascribed to limited finances, human resources and time, as well as the wider organisational 
culture within the Ministry of Health and the two Autonomous Communities. As a result, it is unlikely that any 
successful synergies or collaboration that may have emerged, or other lessons learned will have been formally 
documented for future reference.  
However, informal evaluations were carried out at both national and Autonomous-Community level on a number of 
discrete issues, and changes were made to various SOPs and protocols. These included: (i) implementation of a 
tracking system at the reference laboratory to facilitate post hoc identification of people who have handled specific 
biological samples; (ii) the addition by the Ministry of Agriculture of CCHF to their ongoing surveillance system, 
which reflects ‘One Health’ thinking; and (iii) publication on the Autonomous Community and Ministry of Health 
websites of updated information on ticks, tick-borne diseases, and tick removal.  
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Good practices and lessons learned 
This study details a set of 13 good practices for promoting collaboration and synergies between the authorities and 
the community, as well as four other key lessons learned. In the list below, we have identified the good practices 
specific to tick-borne diseases (T), other zoonoses (Z), and/or to public health threats more generally (PH). Each of 
these points was suggested to us by one or more of our informants.  
• Promoting inter-sectoral collaboration and synergies between the authorities  
− Implement a multi-sectoral tick surveillance programme, with activities integrated between the 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture (T, Z). 
− Conduct multi-sectoral simulation exercises, including key stakeholders at national, Autonomous 
Community and local levels (PH). 
• Promoting collaboration and synergies within the health sector 
− Develop a protocol, in advance of any public health incident, to establish a crisis committee and 
identify a spokesperson to represent the authorities (PH). 
− Ensure efficient and smooth information exchange within and between key health sector institutions, 
including public health agencies at both national and Autonomous Community levels, healthcare 
facilities, and laboratories (PH). 
• Promoting collaboration and synergies between the authorities and the community 
− Adopt different approaches as appropriate when following up different categories of potentially 
exposed contacts in the community (PH). 
− Use pre-existing connections with the community and local organisations to effectively disseminate 
information to people who may be at risk of tick-borne or other zoonotic diseases (T, Z).  
− Provide feedback to community members who contribute to surveillance and other preparedness 
activities by, for example, collecting and sending in ticks (T, Z). 
− Ensure that systematic efforts are made to monitor community perceptions of any public health 
incident (PH). 
− Recognise the rural-urban divide in perceptions regarding tick-borne diseases when designing 
communication strategies and targeting messages (T, Z, PH). 
− Ensure that risk communication messages reach people who could be considered vulnerable to 
infection, but who may not easily receive or access information about prevention. This could include 
people who do not speak Spanish and who may therefore need translated materials (PH). 
− Use occupational health specialists as a valuable resource for dissemination of information on 
prevention for specific, at-risk professions, and as a key support for contact tracing and follow-up 
activities (PH). 
− Build trusting relationships with journalists prior to the crisis (PH). 
− View the community – including interest group associations that serve people who may be at risk of 
zoonotic infections – as a resource for optimising preparedness planning and response actions (Z, 
PH). 
• Other important lessons learned 
− Introduce evaluation activities into standard operating procedures, and establish the practice of 
sharing experiences and lessons learned between stakeholders in different sectors at various levels 
(PH). 
− Verify that haemorrhagic fever protocols have been updated after the 2014–15 Ebola crisis (PH). 
− Establish tracking systems for biological samples in reference laboratories (PH). 
− Train triage and primary care nurses to be on the lookout for unexpected and potentially dangerous 
infectious diseases, for the purposes of rapid diagnosis and initiation of appropriate public health 
measures (PH). 
• This study has demonstrated the potentially substantial value to be gained by building cooperation between 
health and non-health sector authorities and the community in the prevention and control of zoonotic 
diseases in Spain. Goodwill and a willingness to work together was apparent from all the stakeholders 
interviewed, but any successful long-term collaboration will require significant ongoing efforts, planning, 
and resources.  
• Consideration could be given to focusing future operational research on how best to implement and sustain 
the good practices identified above, and how to develop additional methods for effective community-
authority collaboration in preparedness and response to zoonotic diseases. This would complement global 
efforts to implement international conventions such as the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction and the 2005 Bangkok Charter for Health Promotion in a Globalized World, while also building on 
the principles outlined in the 2005 International Health Regulations and EU Decision 1082/2013. 
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1. Background, context and definitions 
EU Decision 1082/2013 on serious cross-border health threats provides a legal basis for collaboration and 
information exchange between EU Member States, and between European and international institutions on 
preparedness planning, prevention, and mitigation in the event of a public health emergency. The Decision pays 
specific attention to arrangements for ensuring interoperability between the health sector and other sectors 
identified as critical in the event of a public health emergency [1].  
As part of the process of increasing inter-sectoral preparedness for serious cross-border public health threats, the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has initiated a case study project to investigate the 
synergies between communities affected by serious public health threats and the institutions (both health- and 
non-health-related) mandated to prepare for and respond to them. The premise for the project is that affected 
communities are increasingly recognised as key resources that can be utilised during public health emergencies 
(this was one of the major lessons learned from the West African Ebola outbreak of 2014–16), and that the 
concerns and experiences of ordinary people should be harnessed as an important part of the response [12]. 
Similarly, it is important to understand how and the extent to which institutions in the health and relevant non-
health sectors can collaborate in such community-oriented work. 
Two EU countries, Spain and the Netherlands, were selected for inclusion in the case study project1, in agreement 
with ECDC and the authorities in the countries concerned. Emerging tick-borne diseases in humans have been 
reported in both countries in recent years, possibly due to environmental changes. These diseases were the focus 
of the work, which has sought to document the perspectives and experiences of key actors in the health sector; 
the relevant non-health sectors and the affected communities.  
The present report is concerned with the events in Spain surrounding two cases of infection with Crimean-Congo 
Haemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) virus that emerged in the Autonomous Community of Castilla y León in August 20162. 
The index case died while the second case – a health worker who attended the primary case while he was 
admitted to an intensive care unit at a Madrid hospital – survived. These are the first autochthonous clinical cases 
of CCHF diagnosed in Spain and in south-western Europe.  
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever 
CCHF is endemic throughout much of southern and eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Turkey is one 
of the most affected countries in the world, although a good surveillance system has been established in the 
country which has lowered the case fatality rate since the first cases were detected in 2002. High levels of 
awareness, both in the community and among health workers, facilitates the early detection of individual CCHF 
cases which can significantly reduce fatality rates [3]. In 2014, 25 EU/EEA countries provided information on CCHF 
through the European Surveillance System (TESSy). Eight cases were reported from Bulgaria and one from the 
United Kingdom (the latter imported from Bulgaria) [4, 5]. No other EU/EEA countries reported cases that year [6]. 
The disease’s expanding global incidence is probably the result of climate and environmental changes. Changes in 
temperature and precipitation affect tick density and activity levels. There is no specific case definition for CCHF in 
the EU, but the generic case definition for viral haemorrhagic fevers is used. There is also no vaccine for CCHF, but 
Ribavirin is used as an antiviral treatment, even though there is an ongoing debate about its efficacy. Commercial 
assays for CCHF genome detection exist, but confirmation by additional assay is needed [7] [8]. 
Since CCHF is one of very few tick-borne diseases that can be transmitted from human to human, specific efforts 
are required to control its spread in healthcare settings, in particular from infected patients to the health workers 
caring for them. A study conducted in medical units in twenty-three countries across the continental landmass of 
Europe and Asia found that there was, at least in theory, a high risk of nosocomial CCHF transmission in many of 
these settings. However, the existence of suitable isolation units in all the facilities surveyed along with the 
availability of personal protective equipment (PPE) in most units reduced this risk. Most facilities also provided 
training for at-risk staff, but additional education was reportedly required in relation to disinfection of medical 
environment, waste management, and PPE use [9].  
Other risk groups for CCHF include people who are exposed to ticks through their occupation or lifestyle, such as 
livestock farmers, shepherds, veterinarians, slaughterhouse workers, hunters, and hikers. Travelers to endemic 
countries are not generally considered to be at high risk, with an estimation of around one case of CCHF infection 
in one million journeys to endemic areas [10].  
In 2010, CCHF virus (CCHFV) was identified in ticks in Spain during a study at a game reserve in Extremadura 
Autonomous Community, a region of the country bordering Portugal. Ticks from other parts of Spain (Castilla León, 
Castilla la Mancha, Aragón and La Rioja) were found to be negative for the virus in the same study. Subsequently, 
 
                                                                    
1 Previous ECDC cases studies on institutional preparedness focussed on Ebola [17], MERS [18] and polio [19] 
2 Parallel work in the Netherlands focused on tick-borne encephaliltis and lyme borreliosis and is the subject of a separate report. 
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research conducted in 2011 in Madrid Autonomous Community found that 50% of all the ticks captured were 
Hyalomma lusitanicum (which, together with Hyaloma marginatum, is a vector for CCHFV), but CCHF itself was not 
investigated in this study. Another study, conducted in Castilla y León Autonomous Community in 2014, looked for 
CCHFV in ticks obtained from slaughterhouses, but failed to find any. Further studies between 2011 and 2013 in 
the same areas identified infected H. Lusitanicum ticks only in the above-mentioned game reserve in Extremadura. 
Thus, at the time of the 2016 CCHF event in Spain, there was no knowledge of any possible risk to any populations 
in the country outside Extremadura, and even there, the risk was limited to a small area. There is, however, 
consensus that future sporadic human cases may occur in Spain [6].  
Spanish healthcare system 
Decentralisation of the Spanish health system began in 1986 and was finalised in 2002 when core health 
competences were transferred to the regional, or Autonomous Community level. There are 17 Autonomous 
Communities in the country and two autonomous cities, each of which is responsible for the organisation and 
provision of health services. Consequently, the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equity has a strategic and 
policy making role but relatively limited operational power. Its roles include coordinating health policy, health 
planning and guidelines, international and border-related health issues, legislation on pharmaceutical products, 
surveillance, and health information systems. Minimum standards are set at national level which all Autonomous 
Communities must meet, but which they may also exceed if they choose to prioritise certain areas. 
In the event of a public health emergency, each Autonomous Community is required to have an Autonomous Focal 
Point available to coordinate with the National Focal Point. The National Focal Point works out of the Coordination 
Centre for Health Alerts and Emergencies (CCAES), which is placed within the Directorate General of Public Health, 
Quality and Innovation in the Ministry of Health. Thus, a network of focal points has been established to facilitate 
continuous and rapid communication during any public health event or emergency that may have implications at 
either national or international level. 
Definitions 
There are three key terms that have been used over the course of this case study project which require definition.  
• ‘Community’ refers here to populations that have been directly affected by or may have been at risk from 
the disease in question. The ‘community’ is seen as distinct from the government authorities who are tasked 
with addressing the disease. Note that in order to avoid confusion between affected communities and the 
Spanish administrative term ‘Autonomous Community’, reference is made throughout the text to Castilla y 
León ‘Autonomous Community’ and Madrid ‘Autonomous Community’.  
• ‘Community engagement’ describes the ‘direct or indirect process of involving communities in decision 
making and/or in the planning, design, governance and delivery of services, using methods of consultation, 
collaboration and/or community control’.  
• ‘Synergy’ refers in this report to the added value that derives from the process and outcome of two or more 
stakeholders or sets of stakeholders working together towards a common goal. The stakeholders could be 
either from the community, or they could be institutional. Any synergy that arises through their 
collaboration can be seen as something that is greater than the sum of its parts. In other words, the 
benefits gained through working together are more than either could have achieved alone, and these 
benefits are, most probably, also mutually shared. 
• ‘Public health emergency preparedness’ is defined as the ‘capability of the public health and healthcare 
systems, communities, and individuals, to prevent, protect against, quickly respond to, and recover from 
health emergencies, particularly those whose scale, timing, or unpredictability threatens to overwhelm 
routine capabilities. Preparedness involves a coordinated and continuous process of planning and 
implementation that relies on measuring performance and taking corrective action’ [11].  
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2. Aims and objectives 
The overall objective of this work was to identify elements that should be considered for interoperability and 
resilience in public health emergency planning, and to support the implementation of EU Decision 1082/2013 on 
serious cross-border health threats. 
The aim of this particular case study project in Spain was to collect evidence and identify good practices related to 
community preparedness for public health emergencies in the EU. Tick-borne diseases formed the basis for the 
study, which aimed to: 
• identify what has worked successfully, and what may not have worked, with particular attention paid to 
practices and patterns of cooperation between affected communities and the official institutions mandated 
to address the threat of tick-borne diseases; 
• where relevant, identify and analyse inter-sectoral collaboration with respect to community-institutional 
synergies, and provide examples of collaborative efforts between health and non-health-related sectors; 
identify lessons learned and practices that could be of use to other EU Member States in the short and 
longer term.  
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3. Methods 
3.1 Study design and participants 
A case study approach was taken for this project, which was based on three qualitative sources of evidence: 
documents; interviews with a range of experts working at national and Autonomous-Community level and focus 
group discussions with community representatives. We chose to conduct interviews with the experts in order to 
allow for in-depth discussion of their professional perspectives and experiences, while the focus group discussions 
were conducted to develop insights into community norms and values relating to the topic. The interviews and 
focus group discussions were conducted during a visit to Spain by the research team in the week of 13–17 
November 2017.  
The interview and focus group discussion participant categories, agreed upon in close collaboration with ECDC and 
the Spanish counterparts (based at CCAES), were as follows: 
Central administration at national level (expert interviews) 
• Ministry of Agriculture, Fish, Food and Environment 
• General Directorate of Public Health 
• Press cabinet/journalist. 
Madrid Autonomous Community (expert interviews) 
• Public health authority 
• Environmental and animal health 
• Press cabinet or communication to the Citizen’s Office. 
Castilla y León Autonomous Community (expert interviews) 
• Human public health 
• Animal public health 
• Communication to the Citizen’s Office. 
Madrid Autonomous Community (Community focus group discussion) 
• Occupational Hazards Unit 
• Emergency room clinicians 
• Local human public health services 
• Central human public health services 
• Human public health emergency team 
• Veterinary health emergency team. 
Castilla y León Autonomous Community (Community focus group discussion with people who are occasionally at 
risk of exposure to ticks)  
• General population 
• Hiker 
• Hunter 
• Veterinarian (focused on hunter activity). 
Castilla y León Autonomous Community (Community focus group discussion with people who have a 
permanent/ongoing risk of exposure to ticks)  
• Veterinarian (focused on livestock) 
• Farmers 
• Livestock farmer 
• National park worker. 
Table 1 below presents an overview of the interviewees and focus group discussion participants who contributed to 
the study. 
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Table 1. Number of interviews and focus group discussions, and respective numbers of participants at 
national and Autonomous-Community level 
 Health sector 
interviews (no. of 
participants) 
Non-health sector 




(no. of participants) 
Total number 
of participants 
National level 1 (2) 2 (4) - 6 
Madrid AC 1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (6) 9 
Castilla y León AC 1 (2) 2 (2) 2 (9) 13 
Total no. of 
participants 
5 8 15 28 
3.2 Data Collection 
Documents 
Background materials on CCHF, including material from other settings where the disease is prevalent, and from Spain 
itself, were identified through online searches. The major points are summarised in Section 4.1. 
Prior to the country visit, the Spanish representatives from CCAES sent press cuttings collected during the 2016 CCHF 
event, clips of relevant TV news stories and links to official websites for tick-borne diseases. These sources, which 
provided an invaluable overview of what had happened and how the public and the media had responded, are 
summarised in Section 4.2.2 in the section entitled ‘Managing the media’.  
Additional documentary materials were collected from interviewees and during focus group discussions while visiting 
Spain. The content is used as supporting text in ‘Findings’ (Section 4).  
Interviews and focus group discussions 
An initial set of questions for the interviews and the focus group discussions was derived from a literature review that had 
been conducted for ECDC during an earlier phase of this community engagement project [12]. The questions were 
structured in the format of a theoretical preparedness cycle, based on pre-incident, incident, and post-incident phases 
[13,14]. They were then adapted based on comments received from ECDC and the Spanish counterparts. The final 
version of the questions is presented in Annex 2. In order to facilitate the interview and focus group discussion process, 
the questions were translated into Spanish and sent in advance to the participants to allow them to prepare.  
The questions were designed to be broadly relevant to all interviewee categories, but the focus varied according to the 
position and particular experience of each individual interviewee or focus group. 
The national-level interviews were conducted at the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, while the 
Autonomous-Community interviews and focus group discussions were conducted at the Madrid Autonomous Community 
and Castilla y León Autonomous Community offices. Interviewees and focus group discussion participants were recruited 
by the CCAES team and the contact point for the study identified in the Autonomous Communities. The CCAES 
coordinated the activities, organised the week’s agenda and dealt with the main logistical issues3. 
3.3 Ethical considerations 
Written informed consent was obtained from all interviewees and focus group participants.  
3.4 Ethical analysis 
The notes from the interviews and focus group discussions were subjected to thematic analysis, using NVivo 
qualitative data software. A set of pre-defined codes was used as a starting point, based on the questions in the 
interviews, with additional codes included as they emerged inductively. The analysis was conducted within the 
context of the theoretical preparedness cycle [13, 14]. Within this framework, the pre-incident phase involves 
preparation; the incident phase involves management, monitoring, investigation and intervention; and the post-
incident phase involves recovery and identification of lessons learned. We also distinguished between national and 
provincial/Autonomous-Community levels in the analysis.  
  
 
                                                                    
3 A senior expert (JK) from Umeå University’s PREPARE consortium conducted the interviews in English, with translation support where 
needed. He was supported by a junior scientist (JA) who took notes and observed the discussions. Two ECDC staff (Svetla Tsolova and 
Hervé Zeller) provided introductions and technical support for the first two days of the country visit, while another ECDC staff member 
(Andrea Würz) provided essential interpretation throughout the visit, moderated the focus group discussions in Spanish and contributed with 
expertise in communication issues. Simultaneous interpretation of the focus group discussions into English was provided by Lidia Redondo, 
courtesy of our hosts from CCAES, and English language notes were then taken from this. We were accompanied to each interview and 
focus group discussion by either Fernando Simon or Berta Suárez Rodríguez, senior staff members of CCAES. 
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4. Findings 
4.1 The two CCHF cases: key events and timeline 
The index case was an adult male who had been hiking on 14 August 2016 in Ávila province, Castilla y León 
Autonomous Community, where he probably became infected through contact with a tick. He suffered an onset of 
symptoms on 16 August and was admitted to hospital on 18 August, before being transferred to the intensive care 
unit (ICU) of the Infanta Leónor Hospital in Madrid on 19 August. He was then transferred to an isolation ICU at 
the Gregorio Marañón Hospital in Madrid on 23 August, where he died on 25 August with a diagnosis of liver failure 
brought on by hepatitis. There was no suspicion of CCHF, and consequently no specific infection control measures 
were implemented, beyond standard procedures, to protect the family members, health workers, and laboratory 
technicians with whom he or his biological samples had contact prior to his death. Similarly, the undertakers who 
prepared his body for burial were unaware of his infection, so they took no special precautions to protect 
themselves. 
Figure 1. Timeline of the two CCHF cases in Spain, 2016 [15]  
 
Note: Dark blue denotes the day of infection for each patient; DOI denotes day of illness; GMUGH denotes Gregorio Marañón 
University General Hospital; HLIU denotes high-level isolation unit; ICU denotes intensive care unit; ILUH denotes Infanta Leonor 
University Hospital. 
The second CCHF case was a female health worker who had taken care of the patient in the ICU between 19 and 
23 August 2016. She developed symptoms on 27 August and went to the emergency room, but was sent home. 
She returned, having failed to recover, and was then hospitalised before being sent to an isolation unit. However, 
the doctors were unable to provide her with a diagnosis. When she recognised that some of her own symptoms 
were similar to those exhibited by the index case that she had cared for and she mentioned this to her doctors, the 
connection between the two individuals was finally made. The family of the index case was then approached and 
asked what environmental contacts he might have had. Tests were conducted, and the diagnosis of CCHF for both 
patients was confirmed on 31 August 2018. See Figure 1 for a timeline of the two cases. 
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4.2 Synergies and connections in the three preparedness 
cycle phases 
4.2.1 Pre-incident phase 
Prior to the incident little or no work had been done in preparation for CCHF in Spain: this was an unexpected 
event. However, a number of pre-existing contextual factors, both facilitators and inhibitors, significantly influenced 
the response to the cases when they emerged. These factors specifically related to ticks and tick-borne diseases (in 
both the human and animal health sectors), as well as issues that were unrelated but which still had an impact on 
the way the event was perceived and addressed by different stakeholders.  
Facilitating factors 
Protocol for identifying a spokesperson during a future event 
An important decision that had been made prior to the CCHF event concerned the public face that Madrid 
Autonomous Community would show in any future public health emergency or event. It had been agreed that a 
respected scientist would represent the Autonomous Community and its positions relating to the situation in any 
media briefings. This decision was based on lessons learned during the 2014–15 Ebola crisis. 
Protocol for crisis management committee 
Decisions had also been made in Madrid Autonomous Community regarding the activities of any future crisis 
management committee. The committee would include all key participating partners (Ministry of Health, 
universities, Autonomous Community representatives and communications experts working with the authorities), 
and it would hold regular meetings during the event. This protocol was followed when responding to the CCHF 
cases. 
Tick surveillance 
Tick surveillance has been ongoing in Spain for 25 years, and intermittently for CCHF since 2009, therefore an 
infrastructure was already in place before the 2016 event. The surveillance system works ‘downwards’, via the 
Ministry of Agriculture to the Autonomous Community veterinarians and the hunters in the field who are 
responsible for collecting and sending in tick samples. It also works ‘upwards’, from those involved in analysis of 
the samples and the epidemiologists, who send their findings to decision makers in the Ministry of Health and the 
Autonomous Communities, to hospitals, and also on to international organisations such as the World Organisation 
for Animal Health (OIE) and the EU’s European Food Safety Authority.  
Collaboration between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture is well established, with monthly 
meetings on issues related to human and animal health, and ad hoc meetings as necessary. The tick surveillance 
mechanism is integrated into this collaboration, and other relevant stakeholders are also involved, through a 
formalised and well developed system.  
Consequently, after the CCHF cases were identified in 2016, the system was fully prepared to respond rapidly with 
an enhanced surveillance programme. To date, no CCHF virus has been identified in Castilla y León where the 
index case is believed to have been bitten and infected (even since surveillance was stepped up in late 2016). 
However, if the virus is identified either in ticks or in animals, prevention messaging can be intensified in the 
specific areas where it has been found.  
Impact of the Ebola crisis 2014/15 
Some elements of the Ebola experience had a positive effect on preparedness activities in Spain, while other 
elements acted as inhibiting factors (see below). From a positive point of view, the CCHF event demonstrated that 
lessons learnt from Ebola had been identified, and many institutional crisis response plans had been updated. 
These included protocols for viral haemorrhagic fevers at national level, which could easily be adapted at 
Autonomous Community level. For example, the protocols helped to improve coordination between epidemiologists 
in the field and the hospitals and/or authorities in the Autonomous Community. They also facilitated the CCHF 
contact tracing process, since the interview forms used when following up CCHF contacts were based on the Ebola 
contact tracing documents.  
As a result of the simulation exercises that were held in many Spanish hospitals during and after the 2014–15 
Ebola crisis, health workers in the country are, in general, more knowledgeable now about handling patients with 
serious infectious diseases (for example using PPE). The capacities of the country’s reference laboratories were 
also enhanced through the Ebola experience. In broad terms therefore, the structures are in place, and people 
know who to contact in the event of an emergency.  
Another key area where benefits from the Ebola experience have been felt was in communications. There was 
consensus among our interviewees that communications during the early stages of the Ebola crisis in Spain were 
poor, but that considerable improvements were made over the course of the crisis in coordination, strategy, and 
implementation. No formal evaluation of communications was conducted post-Ebola, but lessons were nonetheless 
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learned informally, and this had positive implications for the way communications were handled during the CCHF 
event. In the community, memories of Ebola – and specifically of the Spanish nurse who was infected with Ebola 
and who attracted a lot of media attention in the country – reportedly also made people less likely to over-react to 
CCHF, so the population response to the event was quite muted. 
Awareness of ticks in highly exposed communities 
Several of our focus group discussion participants – farmers, hunter, veterinarian and national park worker – 
reported regular exposure to ticks during their daily activities; and while we cannot say that they were necessarily 
representative of their peers, it would seem likely that these groups are, on the whole, well aware of the issue. 
One farmer spoke of a time when he removed as many as 20 ticks from his body at the end of a working day; and 
the hunter talked about the ongoing need to remove ticks from his dogs. By contrast, hikers – a heterogeneous 
group with little formal organisation and much less regular exposure to ticks – were seen as less knowledgeable 
about prevention of tick bites and tick removal. However, although these participants indicated that ticks are 
somewhat inconvenient, they were not seen as a major problem by any of them.  
Inhibiting factors 
Impact of the 2008 economic crisis 
All respondents in official positions spoke of the severe impact of the 2008 economic crisis and subsequent 
austerity measures on their work. The most frequently cited problem at both national and AC level was the inability 
to recruit new staff, which meant that fewer people were available to do the same amount of work. Even with an 
economic upturn in Spain challenges remain, although thanks to multi-tasking and hard work, the core public 
health services do remain intact and functional.  
Political context 
At the time of the CCHF cases in 2016, Spain did not have a Health Minister appointed to the post. The Minister of 
Social Work was placed in charge of the response. Some of our interviewees indicated that this created challenges 
with regard to coordination. 
Impact of the Ebola outbreak 2014/15 
Ebola had a negative impact on the CCHF event in two broad areas. At the political level, we were informed that 
several high-level politicians had been dismissed after the Ebola crisis because of their handling of the situation. 
Thus there could have been a degree of anxiety in the minds of some political actors during the CCHF event. 
Consequently, they wanted to manage the flow of information during the critical first 48 hours of the event, and 
this led to delays in the sending of essential information to people at operational levels. On this occasion, there was 
no further spread of the virus, so there were no serious consequences as a result of this lack of information. 
However, the situation could have been quite different with another pathogen or epidemiological context.  
At the level of individual health workers, there was a residual fear of viral haemorrhagic fevers because of Ebola, 
which made some people reluctant to engage with patients deemed to be at risk of CCHF. Hospitals had different 
standards of personal protection – with some designated high-level isolation units clearly much more advanced 
than others – and this made some health workers in the less well-equipped facilities wonder why they also did not 
have the best protection available. The fact that CCHF does not require the same level of protection as, for 
example, Ebola, and therefore that the most sophisticated PPE may not be necessary when treating CCHF patients, 
did not placate all of those who felt that they had ‘lower’ levels of protection.  
Low awareness of serious tick-borne diseases among health workers 
The fact that the index case had already died – with a diagnosis of liver failure brought on by hepatitis – and been 
buried before he was diagnosed with CCHF is a potential matter of concern. This type of delay in diagnosis points 
to a significant gap in the response that needs to be acknowledged and addressed. The delay may be at least 
partially explained by the fact that, as we were told, the work during and after the Ebola crisis in the country 
placed a clear focus on the likelihood of imported rather than autochthonous cases of viral haemorrhagic fevers 
(even though there had been one autochthonous case of Ebola in a Madrid-based health worker who had been 
caring for a repatriated EVD case in October 2014). The potential for autochthonous cases of viral haemorrhagic 
fevers therefore needs to be incorporated more fully in future preparedness planning.  
4.2.2 Incident phase 
The events of 31 August - 1 September 2016 
There were three major official actors involved during the course of the CCHF event. The Ministry of Health at 
national level; Madrid Autonomous Community, where both cases had been hospitalised and where most of the 
follow-up and communications were therefore required and Castilla y León Autonomous Community, where the 
index case was believed to have been infected. Therefore, at the official level, there was essentially a triangle of 
communications between these three actors. 
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National level 
As soon as the diagnosis of CCHF was confirmed in the reference laboratory on 31 August 2016, the General 
Directors of the Ministry of Health and the Public Health departments in both Madrid Autonomous Community and 
Castilla y León Autonomous Community were informed. However, the information did not reach the Ministry of 
Health communications team before journalists started to call and they were therefore alerted to the situation by 
outside sources. 
Although we learned that subsequent internal coordination within the Ministry regarding CCHF was good, there was 
a misunderstanding during the first 24 hours after diagnosis regarding the village where the index case had come 
from. There are two villages 100 km apart in Castilla y León with the same name, both of which are quite isolated, 
and the information from Madrid Autonomous Community initially identified the wrong village as the source. 
Consequently, the media appeared at the wrong place – though this did have the advantage of allowing the family 
of the index case more time to prepare themselves. Furthermore, the Ministry of Health communicated the wrong 
village to the Castilla León public health authorities, who then made contact with the wrong health centre 
regarding the case – the man had never been treated there. In terms of the disease itself, the misidentification of 
the village had potential implications in developing hypotheses regarding transmission. Migratory birds from Africa 
were initially thought to be the source of the virus, since a particular species reportedly flies over this village. 
However, when it emerged that the source was the other village, which these birds do not cross, further 
hypotheses were considered, in particular the possibility that the virus may have been brought in by animals being 
transported between hunting reserves, and possibly from Extremadura Autonomous Community.  
Madrid Autonomous Community 
As soon as the diagnosis was confirmed, the Madrid Autonomous Community public health authorities created a 
crisis committee in accordance with their protocols. In the beginning, regular meetings were held (daily), until the 
second case had recovered and was discharged from hospital.  
The communications team in Madrid Autonomous Community had already been informed of suspected CCHF cases 
prior to the confirmed diagnosis and they debated among themselves whether to put together a press release 
immediately or whether to wait until more information became available. After the diagnosis on 31 August 2016, 
when journalists started to call, a press release was prepared for dissemination the next day, 1 September 2016. 
Subsequently, a press conference was held at which the situation regarding the two confirmed cases was explained 
to the media. From that moment, information was provided to the media regularly by the Madrid Autonomous 
Community communication team. Journalists requesting additional information were referred to these regular 
updates, partly to keep the press office’s workload under control but also to ensure that all parties were treated 
equally, with no particular newspaper or TV channel receiving preferential treatment. 
Madrid Autonomous Community and Castilla y León Autonomous Community were in contact during the first few 
days, in accordance with the relevant protocols, in order to exchange information on the movements of the index 
cases and to work on identifying possible contacts. The key public health professionals involved in the two 
Autonomous Communities have known each other professionally for many years, and this helped to facilitate 
communication.  
Castilla y León Autonomous Community The CCHF alert came through the Ministry of Health to the General 
Director of Public Health in Castilla y León Autonomous Community. Some, but not all key staff members were then 
informed. This meant that information about the cases reached many of the other colleagues through 
unsubstantiated reports in the media, or directly from journalists who approached them for information that they 
could not then give. Journalists who contacted the Autonomous Community on 31 August therefore had to be 
referred to the press office in Madrid Autonomous Community.  
A bottleneck was also reported regarding the communication channels between Castilla y León Autonomous 
Community and Madrid Autonomous Community, which led to the creation of parallel systems. Key aspects of the 
information exchange process between Autonomous Communities are supposed to be authorised by the general 
directors, who have political oversight of the process, with some information also passing through the Ministry of 
Health. However, in this case some important information was not passed downwards. Some technical experts 
therefore found it necessary to communicate directly with their counterparts. At that early stage, it was not known 
who had been exposed or the extent of the risk, and they considered it important to rapidly exchange any verified 
information, in particular to ensure that health workers in the two Autonomous Communities were kept as fully 
informed as possible. 
Once the information about the cases had been circulated within the Autonomous Community, a press release was 
developed in coordination with the animal and environmental health departments, with a message to the public to 
stay calm and reassurances that the risk of infection was low. A link to information on the Autonomous Community 
website was included, with details of how to protect against ticks and how to remove them. At this stage, it was 
not known whether there were further undetected cases in the community. This press release stimulated quite a lot 
of interest from the national media. 
TECHNICAL REPORT Synergies in community and institutional public health emergency preparedness for tick-borne diseases in Spain 
13 
Following up potential contacts 
Contact follow-up was a major task, with around 400 people included in the process. There were six people in 
Castilla y León (all close family members of the index case) and the rest were laboratory workers or health workers 
in Madrid Autonomous Community, exposed or potentially exposed before the CCHF diagnosis had been made.  
Contact tracing and follow-up started in Castilla y León Autonomous Community on 1 September 2016. The 
approach was based on an operational case definition that had been developed for Ebola, and it included 
investigations into where the index case had been over the incubation and infective periods, as well as clinical 
details about the disease and ongoing treatments. The adult daughter of the index case was contacted, and 
information about other people who could have been exposed – all of them family members – was collected 
through her. Doctors then visited these six individuals at their homes in order to avoid any possible risk of 
spreading the virus by their attending a healthcare facility, and they were phoned once a day until the end of the 
follow-up period to assess any changes in their health. We were told that the family members were very 
collaborative, in spite (or perhaps because) of the fact that they were in mourning, and the follow-up process 
proceeded smoothly. The follow-up ended on 9 September, 14 days after their last physical contact with the index 
case (which is one day longer than the documented maximum incubation period [16]). 
The situation was considerably more complex in Madrid, as it was not clear who had been in contact either with 
the index case himself, the secondary case, or the biological samples taken from them. Consequently, all the 
workers at the reference laboratory and on the wards where the cases had been treated were deemed to be at 
risk. A follow-up was also made at the funeral home where the body had been prepared for burial. All the contacts 
and potential contacts were then placed into a systematic risk classification system. Individuals were put into a set 
of concentric circles with those closest to the middle considered to be at highest risk, and contacted twice daily for 
the duration of the 14-day follow-up period. These higher-risk individuals included the health workers who took 
care of the patients without using the appropriate PPE, in particular in the intensive care unit; and one person from 
the reference laboratory, who happened to be pregnant. Frequency of contact by the follow-up team was less for 
those placed in the outer circles. Anxiety was reported among some contacts, but this was for the most part 
managed effectively. All contacts were cleared after the requisite 14 days of follow-up. 
Two important distinctions can be made between the contact follow-up process in Madrid and in Castilla y León. 
First, the infection of the health worker in Madrid was detected when the follow-up period for the contacts of the 
index case was already advanced (see Figure 1), which made the active follow-up period for contacts in Castilla 
León shorter than the 14 days that were necessary for most contacts in Madrid. Thus, the anxiety of the contacts 
in Castilla y León was less drawn-out than for those in Madrid. In addition, since the Madrid community included 
key staff from the reference laboratory that receives biological samples from eight hospitals in and around the city, 
there was inevitably some disruption to the important diagnostic routines in place there during that period. Delays 
in the routine testing of biological samples and the returning of results due to limited laboratory capacity were 
noted by our interviewees, and this was exacerbated by the situation. 
Secondly, the affected ‘community’ in Madrid consisted of people employed by the healthcare system, which meant 
that the contact tracing and follow-up process went through established official channels between the public health 
authorities, the reference laboratory, and the hospitals concerned. By contrast, the affected ‘community’ in Castilla 
y León consisted of the close family circle of the index case, which comprised only six contacts, so a more personal 
approach was required. 
Managing the media 
After an initial spark of interest, media coverage of CCHF was quite limited. The two cases emerged towards the end 
of the summer holidays, and journalists were, in general, more interested in covering other issues during this period. 
Our analysis of several national and regional newspapers (including El País and El Mundo) identified 45 articles up 
until 22 September 2016, 23 of which (51%) were published by 6 September 2016, indicating a rapid cooling of 
interest in the topic after the first week. Topics covered included the background of the disease, modes of 
transmission, preventive measures, symptoms, and the case fatality rate; and it was notable that coverage tended to 
reflect both the tone and content of the official updates. There was a strong emphasis on the importance of people 
being alert but not alarmed; and several of the articles also explained what the Ministry of Health and the public 
health authorities in Madrid Autonomous Community were doing to keep the virus from spreading further. 
Most of the official communications on the topic took place in Madrid Autonomous Community as opposed to Castilla y 
León Autonomous Community, because most of the contacts were health workers or laboratory technicians working in 
the Madrid Autonomous Community. Key objectives of the communications included ensuring that the community 
remained calm, and reassuring people that the risk of any further spread of the virus was low. To this end, regular 
briefings were provided to journalists (once or twice each day) during the period directly after the diagnosis, even if 
there were no significant updates to report. The briefings always came from the same source, and they included a link 
to information on either the official Ministry of Health or the Autonomous Community website on how to protect 
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against ticks and remove them4. Face-to-face meetings were also held with journalists to educate them about CCHF 
and tick-borne diseases, in order to maximise accurate and balanced reporting.  
In addition, steps were taken to ensure that the release of information to the media and to health workers and 
hospitals where people remained under surveillance was coordinated. The Madrid Autonomous Community 
occupational health team, which was responsible for supporting and informing the health workers, played a critical 
role in this process. Key actors in hospitals received press releases shortly before the general release, so that they 
were informed in advance of any possible media enquiries, but all other sources received the information at the 
same time, thereby avoiding any sense that one group was being privileged over another. 
By being predictable and transparent, and by relying on pre-existing and trusting relationships with individual 
journalists, the press offices of the Ministry of Health and the Autonomous Communities sought to pre-empt any 
doubts in journalists’ minds about what was happening, and thereby to avoid sensationalist reporting that could 
create public alarm. The overall result of these efforts was accurate and factual coverage, and a near absence of 
misinformation (there was just one case of a media outlet incorrectly reporting that there had been another 
confirmed case when, in fact, samples had not yet been processed). People at community level were aware of the 
media coverage of CCHF, but – as intended by the authorities – they were not particularly concerned.  
Monitoring social media 
Insufficient human resources limited efforts by the authorities to monitor social media in order to ascertain if there 
were rumours or misinformation circulating in the community, or otherwise to understand community perceptions 
of the event. The communications team at the Ministry of Health receives alerts from a range of official sources, 
but not from the community itself. The public health authorities at one of the Autonomous Communities told us 
that they monitor social media by following specific institutions and hashtags – but it was pointed out that if a 
keyword is missed, the search may not pick up a point of interest. Rumours may also be reported informally 
through contacts with journalists seeking clarification or comment on an issue, but this is not a systematic process. 
No significant rumours were reported on social media in relation to CCHF, although there was a report on social 
media that ‘Excalibur’ – the dog belonging to the Spanish nurse infected with Ebola in 2014, that was 
controversially euthanised – had at one stage visited the village where the index case was infected with CCHF. The 
precise implication of this claim was never made clear. 
Community perceptions and response 
Madrid Autonomous Community set up a hotline for people to call in order to receive information about CCHF and 
tick-borne diseases, the only dedicated channel that we heard about for community members to communicate 
directly with the authorities. The hotline received a total of 41 calls logged between 31 August and October 1, an 
average of just over one call per day. Although we did not obtain details during our interviews regarding the extent 
to which the hotline was advertised, and how well it was known throughout the population, the impression from 
our interviewees was that the small number of calls indicated a muted response to CCHF from the wider 
community. Since the incident only lasted a few days, there was not really time for concerns to develop to any 
great extent. However, specific concerns were raised by the two sub-groups which may have had more direct 
exposure: health workers in Madrid Autonomous Community, and people at risk of tick bites in Castilla y León 
Autonomous Community. 
Health workers 
As soon as CCHF was diagnosed, the public health authorities in Madrid Autonomous Community communicated to 
all the hospitals under their jurisdiction, telling health workers to stay calm. They clarified that the second case had 
been caused by the index case’s illness going undiagnosed, and that since it was now known to have been CCHF, 
precautions were in place and the chance of further spread was extremely low. We were told by the authorities 
that consequently there was ‘no real worry’ within this community.  
However, concerns were raised by health workers in Castilla y León Autonomous Community, who asked their 
leadership what actions should be taken in the event of a patient presenting with suspected CCHF infection at an 
emergency room or in a primary healthcare setting. A protocol, adapted from a pre-existing set of SOPs and 
protocols for viral haemorrhagic fevers, was produced as early as 2 September and circulated to the appropriate 
facilities. This was one of the very first official activities in response to CCHF, and the speed with which it was 
conducted was at least partially the product of pressure from the health workers themselves.  
 
                                                                    
4 http://www.msssi.es/profesionales/saludPublica/enfermedadesEmergentes/Crimea_Congo/home.htm 
This website includes 1) General information and recommendations for citizens: transmission, symptoms, CCHF diagnosis/treatment; treatment-
seeking behaviour; prevention & control measures undertaken by the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality; surveillance; coordination 
activities between the human and animal health and the environment sectors; tick removal; control of ticks with repellents and insecticides. 2) 
Technical information for health professionals: risk of CCHF transmission in Spain; surveillance; vector; virulence and lethality; diagnosis; disease 
development; case notification; contact tracing; hospitalisation and isolation; care with biological samples; protection against infection among 
health workers. 
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Concerns were also raised by a number of health workers about the types of PPE available in different healthcare 
settings. The standards of protection were better at designated high-level isolation units, and those who had what 
appeared to be less secure equipment complained that they would not be protected as well as their colleagues, in 
spite of the fact that CCHFV is not easily transmissible from human to human, and that very high levels of 
protection – such as those used for Ebola – are not really necessary. They argued that the discrepancies reflected a 
lack of coherence in the planning by the different hospitals. However, it could equally be argued that all the 
hospitals met the required minimum standards as laid down by the Ministry of Health and the respective 
Autonomous Community public health authorities, and that hospitals had quite legitimately and legally prioritised 
different areas. Since there were no further cases, this issue did not become a major problem, but it does point to 
the importance of hospital leadership communicating clearly to their front-line workers why certain decisions about 
personal protection may have been made.  
Individuals and groups at risk of tick bites – Castilla y León Autonomous Community 
As indicated above, people who spend a lot of time outdoors in Castilla y León Autonomous Community are used to 
ticks, and while they are an inconvenience, they do not generally consider them to be a major problem. A national 
park worker, who is regularly exposed to ticks in her job, said that until the CCHF case emerged, she had never 
known that tick bites could cause fatal disease. A hunter concurred, saying that while ticks themselves are not a 
new issue, the diseases that they may transmit, at least to humans, are. (No mention was made during any of the 
focus group discussions at community level of tick-borne encephalitis, lyme borreliosis, or tuleremia.) The CCHF 
case has, it appeared, brought about a change in perceptions of the potential dangers of ticks among at least some 
people who are frequently exposed.  
Indeed, during the incident phase, increased awareness of CCHF led to more people with tick bites attending their 
doctors, and consequently 13 cases of suspected CCHF were reported nationwide during September 2016. In one 
sense this is positive, as it shows that people – both in the community and among health workers – were 
sufficiently informed to act on their concerns about the disease. However, it also created challenges with the 
requirement to immediately activate the expensive isolation units that were needed, unnecessarily as it turned out, 
for each case. 
With regard to people who are less frequently exposed, one of our focus group discussion participants had 
reportedly visited the village where the CCHF index case had lived, where he heard that the people there were not 
very worried about potentially being infected themselves. Their main concern was with the media, which had come 
to interview the family and other inhabitants about the case, and which reportedly caused some disturbance.  
Another focus group discussion participant, who said she was only infrequently exposed to ticks, said that she 
knew the case had been caused by a virus, which she thought had been brought by a migratory bird returning 
from Africa, but she had not been alarmed at any stage during the incident phase. Since there were no further 
cases, she said she had more or less forgotten about it.  A hiker reported that she always wears long trousers 
when she goes out, but many of her friends do not: while she understands the issue and takes precautions herself, 
there are many who do not. ‘There is not enough concern within the public for these risks,’ she said. 
4.2.3 Post-incident phase  
No substantive evaluation or post-incident review was conducted after the CCHF event. According to our 
respondents, this was due to limited resources (financial and human) and, according to some insiders, the 
prevailing organisational culture in the Ministry of Health and the two affected Autonomous Communities. We were 
told of a special unit for evaluation that had been established in one of the Autonomous Communities shortly 
before the financial crisis of 2008, but it was disbanded around five years ago. This, we were told, indicated a lack 
of political interest in prioritising post-event evaluations. 
Our interviewees clearly recognised the importance of retaining institutional memory of lessons learned during 
public health events – for example, as regards communication strategies in a situation of uncertainty – and the 
need to evaluate during the preparedness and response planning process. As we were told, you can always do 
better, in particular during the early phase of a situation when uncertainty prevails about the scale of the problem 
and the risk it presents. In addition, lessons will be learned during a crisis, and there can be great benefit in 
documenting these properly. However, it was also pointed out that very few countries in Europe have systems in 
place for substantive post-incident reviews or evaluations, so the situation in Spain is by no means unique. 
In spite of the absence of an overall systematic evaluation, informal evaluations were nonetheless conducted on 
specific matters at both national and Autonomous Community level, and changes were made to particular SOPs 
and protocols accordingly. These included: 
• Laboratory protocols. A new tracking system was put in place at the central laboratory in Madrid 
Autonomous Community, so that it is now possible to establish post hoc who may have handled particular 
biological samples. This measure aims to provide an accurate database of personnel who may need to be 
followed up after possible exposure to dangerous pathogens. 
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• CCHF virus surveillance. The Ministry of Agriculture concluded after the event that CCHFV should be added 
to their regular surveillance protocol – even though CCHF is a problem for human health and not animal 
health, and strictly speaking it does not therefore fall under their remit. This reflects an important decision 
to adopt a ‘One Health’ approach, and it also shows that the country has an adaptive surveillance system. 
However, one of the hunters we spoke with said that he was involved in collecting ticks for some of the 
studies mentioned in Section 1 above, yet he has never received any feedback regarding their disease 
status. He would like to be informed of these details, and the fact that he does not receive the results 
reduces his trust in the authorities.  
• Messages about tick removal. Recognising the need for an updated information campaign, new messages 
on correct tick removal were produced and published on the Autonomous Community and the Ministry of 
Health websites as a means of reaching the general population. They were also sent by email to health 
workers at hospitals and primary health centres. This was done in September 2016 and again as a reminder 
in the spring of 2017 as the new tick season approached. The messaging stressed the importance of 
removing ticks with tweezers (not alcohol, finger nails, or by burning them); and that if a tick was 
particularly difficult to remove, people should go to their primary health centre.  
• Messages for preventing tick-associated risks. The Ministry of Health, in collaboration with the National 
Federation of Municipalities and Provinces (FEMP), coordinated an information seminar on the prevention of 
tick- and Aedes albopictus-associated risks, aimed at professionals working at municipality level who are 
responsible for sanitation and vector control. 
At community level, people have reportedly not been very worried since the CCHF cases, but due to the increase in 
information concerning tick-borne diseases, we were informed that there has been an increase in the number of 
people in Castilla y León Autonomous Community going to their primary care centre doctors to have ticks removed.  
4.3 Other observations 
Future information provision to the community at risk of tick bites 
The community at risk of tick bites is heterogeneous and has a wide range of information needs. Our focus group 
discussion participants in Castilla y León Autonomous Community collectively recognised that (a) people need to 
know that there is a threat of tick-borne diseases in their area, but also that (b) those who are potentially at risk 
then have an obligation, once they are aware of this threat, to inform themselves so that they can ensure they are 
properly protected. Therefore, in a practical sense the authorities need to raise general awareness of the issue, and 
then ensure that detailed information is easily accessible when and where necessary. Community health centres 
and schools were identified as examples of useful venues for raising awareness on protective measures, with the 
potential for acting as ‘multipliers’ of information dissemination, to a wide population. This would help to minimise 
potential panic during a public health threat, as would apathy regarding the source and the risk – both of which 
would obviously have clear benefits for prevention.  
As a group that requires legal authorisation, hunters are well organised and can be quite easily reached with 
information about tick-borne diseases through their various federations and clubs. For example, hunting schools 
provide information on how to take care of hunting dogs, including ticks and tick removal, and they also reported 
having social media groups through which they keep themselves well informed and connected. Hunters are also in 
quite regular contact with the authorities when, for example, they find sick animals while out hunting. They then 
call a vet who is supposed to come and investigate. There were, however, some frustrations voiced about the fact 
that this process is not always as efficient as it might be, indicating problems in the flow of information within the 
veterinarian network.  
Similarly, farmers are in principle easily reached via the veterinarians with whom they work on a routine basis, so 
the theoretical possibility exists to inform them through this channel. However, while information meetings were 
regularly held for farmers in Castilla y León Autonomous Community by veterinarians prior to the 2008 economic 
crisis, financial limitations have brought these meetings to an end. Thus, a potential channel for providing farmers 
with information on prevention of tick-borne diseases is no longer being utilised. 
Hikers are the least organised and most varied of the different interest groups with whom we spoke. Some 
organised hikers’ groups do exist, meeting up once a month or so, and these could theoretically be identified and 
targeted with information. However, most people go hiking into tick-infested areas alone without any sort of 
organisation. The suggestion was therefore made to take advantage of the information boards that are often to be 
found at car parks at the start of hiking routes by posting signs with messages about ticks and the prevention of 
disease. Links to websites run by the Autonomous Community public health authorities could also be included 
there, with QR codes that can be scanned by a mobile phone app to take the hiker directly to the site. In addition, 
the websites, which show hiking routes and are used by hikers for planning purposes, could be used for 
disseminating prevention information.  
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We understood that most of the immigrants in Castilla y León Autonomous Community speak enough Spanish to 
understand basic health messages, but that some may only speak Arabic. We were told that language issues would 
be taken into account in any campaigns to raise awareness of tick-borne diseases.  
Multi-sectoral simulation exercises 
It was accepted that a degree of uncertainty at the start of a crisis is almost inevitable, and that established 
protocols may not always be followed perfectly. For example, during the first critical hours after the CCHF diagnosis 
had been made, there were bottlenecks in the exchange of information at the various administrative and technical 
levels. Consequently, journalists were aware of the situation before some of the key technical experts, who spoke 
of not being able to act because, as they saw it, key information was being withheld from them.  
These experiences led to several calls from our participants to conduct multi-sectoral simulation exercises, 
including both national and Autonomous Community-level authorities, as a means of minimising errors during this 
critical phase. Simulations have previously been conducted on Ebola-type scenarios in healthcare settings, but 
these have not included other essential sectors such as communications. They have also focused on imported, not 
autochthonous cases – though after the CCHF experience, the latter should clearly also be included. It was not 
immediately clear if or how the community, which includes such a range of diverse groups, would or could be 
engaged in simulation exercises addressing infectious disease threats. 
Diagnosing the index case 
The delay in diagnosing the index case has already been described above, but it may be important to highlight 
once again the importance of ensuring early diagnosis of any serious infectious disease. In this case, there was 
only one secondary case – who fortunately survived – but concerns were nonetheless raised by some of our 
interviewees that a more infectious pathogen could emerge in the future, with the potential to infect many more 
people before it is properly diagnosed and effective control measures are put in place.  
There will, by definition, always be challenges in preparing for future, unknown threats, but this case underlines 
the importance of preparing not only for a recurrence of previous events – or, in military terms, fighting the last 
battle – but also for anticipating the next, unknown one. For example, while dengue and Zika have ensured that a 
great deal of effort in Spain is now focused on preparedness for these and other emerging mosquito-borne 
diseases (e.g. West Nile Fever), until 2016 ticks were low priority for public health authorities.  
With the CCHF experience in mind, our interviewees indicated a shift in thinking from ‘it can’t happen here’ to ‘we 
need to be ready in case it does happen here’. We were advised that this thinking needs to be extended specifically 
to triage nurses in hospitals and to nurses in primary care settings, who should receive additional training on the 
identification of unexpected and potentially dangerous infectious diseases. Ultimately, what is needed is a more 
sensitive and specific public health system, so that serious problems are quickly picked up and while false alerts, 
that can bring about public panic and considerable expense to the health system, are minimised.  
Rural-urban divide in perceptions about tick-borne disease 
The community respondents in Ávila overwhelmingly perceived people from the cities to be more concerned about 
tick-borne diseases than they are, even though those in the rural areas are actually most at risk. This applies to 
CCHF as well as to other tick-borne diseases. For them, ticks are a regular part of life, and they have extensive 
experience of being bitten, as well as good knowledge of preventive practices. This has implications for any 
communication strategy to prevent tick-borne diseases. One size will not necessarily fit all: rural and urban 
populations should be targeted with different messages.  
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5. Good practices and conclusions 
5.1 Good practices 
This section outlines a set of 13 good practices for promoting collaboration and synergy between the authorities 
and the community identified in this study, as well as four other key lessons learned. These all apply specifically to 
CCHF, but also to other zoonoses or to public health threats more generally. For this reason, we have identified 
each of the good practices as being specific to tick-borne diseases (T), other zoonoses (Z), and/or to public health 
threats more generally (PH). 
The good practices include both points that have already been implemented by the authorities in Spain to a greater or lesser 
extent and areas where we were told that improvements could still be made. As such, the good practices and lessons 
learned are presented as objectives that may be worked towards, both by the authorities in Spain and by those in other EU 
Member States. Note that each of the points below was suggested to us by one or more of our informants. 
An overall observation from our week in Spain and from the reviewed documentation was that within institutional 
settings, existing protocols provided a clear basis for communications and collaboration and, apart from the specific 
challenges identified above, these channels reportedly worked well. Much less focus has previously been given to 
promoting collaboration and synergy with the community, however, hence the emphasis given to these below.  
Promoting inter-sectoral collaboration and synergies between the 
authorities 
• Implement a multi-sectoral tick surveillance programme, with activities integrated between the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Agriculture (T, Z). A ‘One-Health’, multi-sectoral approach to tick surveillance – 
including the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and environmental health partners – offers the 
possibility for quickly responding to an outbreak, identifying at-risk geographical areas, and providing 
enhanced messaging on prevention and control for those at-risk. ECDC can offer to provide scientific expert 
advice, for example via the Vectornet tick-borne disease group, on tick behaviour, risks linked to tick-bites, 
and surveillance data interpretation. 
• Conduct multi-sectoral simulation exercises, including key stakeholders at national, Autonomous-Community 
and local levels (PH). Multi-sectoral simulation exercises, including both national and regional level 
authorities as well as relevant ministries (e.g. Agriculture and Environment) have the potential for 
identifying bottlenecks and gaps in preparedness and response protocols that can then be addressed. 
Efforts to conduct such exercises could include autochthonous cases of disease. ECDC may be able to 
organise a simulation exercise in Spain, perhaps in coordination with one of the neighbouring EU countries 
(i.e. Portugal and/or France). 
Promoting collaboration and synergy within the health sector 
• Develop a protocol, in advance of any public health incident to establish a crisis committee and identify a 
spokesperson to represent the authorities (PH). By making provisional agreements before the event with 
key institutional and individual actors who may be required to join a crisis committee or to act as 
spokespeople, the response to a public health incident can be properly coordinated during the first few 
critical hours. This can significantly reduce the possibility of errors at the start that may slow up or 
otherwise hinder subsequent response activities. 
• Ensure efficient and smooth information exchange within and between key health sector institutions, 
including public health agencies at both national and Autonomous-Community level, healthcare facilities, 
and laboratories (PH). It should always be a priority to ensure that operational personnel and technical 
experts receive all the relevant information that may be available as soon as it is obtained and validated. 
Promoting collaboration and synergy between the authorities and the 
community 
• Adopt different approaches, as appropriate, when following up different categories of potentially exposed 
contacts in the community (PH). Health workers who may be exposed to nosocomial infection of a zoonotic 
agent can be followed up through professional channels; but people exposed by other means, such as via a 
vector, will probably not be directly connected to the health sector, and they will need to be identified and 
followed up using alternative means. Contact follow-up protocols need to be sufficiently flexible to take 
these different contact categories into account. ECDC may be able to make available to Member States a 
generic contact tracing mobile app, based on those developed for Ebola in West Africa. 
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• Use pre-existing connections with the community and local organisations for the effective dissemination of 
information to people who may be at risk of tick-borne or other zoonotic diseases (T, Z). Hunters in Spain are in 
close contact with one another and the authorities (during the licencing process, and when they find and report sick 
animals); while livestock farmers are regularly in touch with veterinarians. These channels can be used to facilitate 
the effective provision of prevention information to people who are potentially at risk of infection.  
• Provide feedback to community members who contribute to surveillance and other preparedness activities by 
collecting and sending in ticks (T, Z): People will generally be more cooperative with the authorities in surveillance 
and other preparedness activities (such as hunters sending in ticks for analysis, or identifying sick animals) if they 
receive regular updates on the datasets to which they are contributing. This could take the form of annual 
summaries showing the geographical patterns of tick infestation, or similar.  
• Ensure that systematic efforts are made to monitor community perceptions of any public heath incident (PH). By 
monitoring community perceptions of an issue, it will be possible for the authorities to respond to any misinformation 
or rumours that may emerge. Such a process can also help to identify new cases or clusters, to which the authorities 
can then respond. Social media have been used in some settings to monitor community perceptions, as has 
documenting topics of concern that are raised on telephone hotlines. 
• Recognise the rural-urban divide in perceptions about tick-borne diseases when designing communication strategies 
and targeting messages (T, Z, PH). Ticks are seen as a greater problem by those living in the city, who are at 
negligible risk, than by those in the rural areas who are affected by them on a daily basis – this has implications for 
any communication strategy. Rural and urban populations should be targeted with different messages, possibly 
disseminated via different channels.  
• Ensure that risk communication messages reach people who could be considered vulnerable to infection, but who 
may not easily receive or access information on prevention. This could include people who do not speak Spanish and 
who may therefore need translated materials (PH). The linguistic needs of tourists, temporary visitors and non-
Spanish speaking immigrants – especially those who work with livestock, and who may therefore be at increased 
risk from ticks or other zoonotic diseases – should be taken into account in any communication campaigns. 
• Use occupational health specialists as a valuable resource for disseminating information on prevention to specific, at-
risk professions (PH). In addition to information dissemination, these occupational health experts can also play a key 
role in supporting contact tracing and follow up activities. 
• Build trusting relationships with journalists prior to the crisis (PH). Relationships with journalists can work in two 
directions: they can act as important sources of information about happenings in the community, while also 
disseminating key information to at-risk populations. Working with individual journalists who are known to be reliable 
during a public health incident can bring about significant mutual benefits. 
• View the community – including interest group associations that serve people who may be at risk of zoonotic 
infections – as a resource for optimising preparedness planning and response actions (Z, PH). An informed, at-risk 
community understands the challenges to adopting effective preventive practices for themselves better than anyone. 
Through dialogue with well-placed community representatives, it may be possible to identify areas where 
improvements can be made to prevention that can then be disseminated either to the wider population or to specific 
risk groups, as appropriate. 
Other important lessons learned 
• Introduce evaluation activities into Standard Operating Procedures, and establish the practice of sharing 
experience and lessons learned among stakeholders in different sectors and at different levels (PH): Efforts 
to conduct formal evaluations after a public health incident can ensure that institutional memories are 
sustained and that lessons learned are remembered over the longer term. Relevant authorities could be 
encouraged to institutionalise regular post-event evaluations by including them as a requirement within 
SOPs. ECDC may be able to support colleagues at national level (and, with their agreement, at local level) 
by providing them with evaluation tools, and by organising meetings to discuss lessons learned that can be 
applied for further improvements in preparedness planning. 
• Check that haemorrhagic fever protocols have been updated since the 2014-15 Ebola crisis (PH). Following 
on from the previous point, a wealth of experience was gained during the Ebola crisis, and it is important to 
ensure that the key lessons learned are captured by updating the relevant protocols. This can have benefits 
for the control of viral haemorrhagic fevers as well as for other serious infectious diseases. 
• Establish tracking systems for biological samples in reference laboratories (PH). It is important to know who 
has handled specific biological samples during processing, so that individuals who may have been exposed 
to dangerous pathogens can be identified and placed under surveillance, as appropriate. 
• Train triage and primary care nurses to be on the lookout for unexpected and potentially dangerous 
infectious diseases, for the purposes of rapid diagnosis and initiation of appropriate public health measures 
(PH). As the first potential point of contact with the healthcare system for a patient with a serious infectious 
disease, triage and primary care nurses have a critical role to play in the early identification and diagnosis of 
any emerging disease, and thereby the triggering of the process that leads to rapid isolation of the patient 
and appropriate use of PPE for health workers.  
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5.2 Study strengths and limitations 
This study benefited from the wide range of professional backgrounds represented by the interviewees and focus 
group participants, and from the inclusion of stakeholders at national, Autonomous Community and community 
level. Furthermore, our semi-structured qualitative interview and focus group discussion methodology encouraged 
people to speak about issues in a way that they wanted to talk about them, and to raise topics that they felt were 
important. Although it was a relatively small project (just 28 people), we believe that we were able to identify and 
explore most, if not all of the core points relating to preparedness for and response to the 2016 CCHF events in 
Spain.  
The fact that we were accompanied to all the interviews and focus group discussions by CCAES staff meant that 
we could discuss with them over the course of the week’s visit what we were learning, and also ask questions to 
clarify issues which was of great assistance to us. Their presence also allowed them to meet and listen to 
stakeholders from the Autonomous Community and other community levels who they may not otherwise have 
encountered, providing them with an additional and valuable perspective of events.  
However, it is possible that the presence of CCAES staff could have biased the responses of some interviewees or 
focus group participants, as they may not have wanted to share certain issues with national level officials. If this 
was the case, we do not believe that it caused any significant biases in the database, as most issues were 
discussed with more than one respondent, and while there was not universal agreement on everything, our study 
participants generally complemented one another’s content rather than contradicting it. 
5.3 Conclusions and possible directions for future research 
This study has demonstrated the potentially substantial value to be gained by building collaboration between 
health and non-health sector authorities and the community in the prevention and control of zoonotic and other 
communicable disease threats in Spain. Goodwill and a willingness to work together was apparent from all the 
stakeholders interviewed, but any successful long-term collaboration will require significant ongoing efforts, 
planning, and resources.  
Consideration could be given to directing future operational research to focus on how best to implement and 
sustain the good practices identified above, and to develop additional means of bringing about effective 
community-authority collaborations in preparedness and response to zoonotic diseases. Such work would 
complement global efforts to implement international conventions such as the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction and the 2005 Bangkok Charter for Health Promotion in a Globalized World, while also building on 
the principles outlined in the 2005 International Health Regulations as well as EU Decision 1082. 
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Annex 1. Documents collected during country 
visit 
The titles/headings of all the documents cited below have been translated from Spanish into English. 
National level (Ministry of Health, Social Services and 
Equality, CCAES) 
• Confirmation of cases of Crimea-Congo haemorrhagic fever in Spain (Press release, 1 September 2016) 
• Situation note on Crimea-Congo haemorrhagic fever (Press release, 3 September 2016) 
• Questions and answers on the infection caused by the Crimea-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (Information 
sheet, 17 May 2017) 
• CCHFV study on ticks, September 2016–April 2017 (Map of affected areas in Castilla y Léon AC)   
Madrid Autonomous Community 
• Health [Ministry] confirms cases of Crimea-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (Press release, 1 September 2016) 
• Action guide against tick bites (advice for medical staff, including algorithm for suspected cases, October 
2017) 
• Ticks: discomfort and diseases that they transmit (Chapter in information booklet, also including a chapter 
on the use of insect repellents, March 2017) 
• Situation update on the evaluation of transmission risk for Crimea-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (April 
2017) 
• Epidemiological surveillance network of Madrid Autonomous Community: surveillance protocol for Crimea-
Congo haemorrhagic fever (Official protocol, 16 June 2017) 
• Recommendations for the prevention of diseases from tick bites (four-page infographic leaflet, no date, but 
produced after the CCHF event) 
• Stakeholder connections at the Environmental Health Unit (no date). 
Castilla y Léon Autonomous Community 
• The authorities consider the risk of Crimea-Congo haemorrhagic fever to be very low (Press release, 1 
September 2016) 
• The authorities maintain follow-up of six people for Crimea-Congo fever [sic] (Press release, 5 September 
2016) 
• Prevention of tick-borne diseases (two-page infographic leaflet, no date) 
• How to remove a tick (two-page information sheet, no date) 
• Prevention of infections transmitted by ticks (two-page information sheet, no date) 
• Information for health professionals regarding characterisation of Crimea-Congo haemorrhagic fever in 
suspected cases (four-page information sheet, no date) 
• Evaluation algorithm for investigation of Crimea-Congo haemorrhagic fever for the epidemiological 
surveillance network of Castilla y Léon (two-page document with flow charts, no date). 
Community groups 
• The ticks are coming! Advice for prevention (article in hunting magazine, Cazawonke, 16 May 2012) 
• Goodbye to the ticks, fleas and other parasites that affect your dogs (article in hunting magazine, El Coto 
de Caza, 29 May 2013) 
• Ten commandments for hunters and countryside lovers to protect against ticks (article printed from website 
of hunters, Real Federación Española de Caza, no date). 
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Annex 2. Interview and focus group 
discussion questions 
Two sets of questions are given below: one for interviews with institutional representatives, and the other for focus 
group discussions with the community. The questions are concerned with community-institutional synergies in the 
context of the two cases of Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) that occurred in Spain in 2016.  
Interview questions for institutional representatives 
Part 1 - Mapping the different stakeholder/interest groups 
1. Please tell us how you and the institution you work for have been or are involved with Crimean–Congo 
haemorrhagic fever (CCHF). 
2.  Could you map out on a piece of paper (a) the different stakeholder/interest groups or groups that have 
previously been involved with preparing for tick-borne diseases, and (b) those that were involved in responding 
to the 2016 CCHF cases. Which of these groups would you define as coming from the community, and which 
would you define as ‘administration’? Do you think there are any stakeholder/interest groups – institutional or 
from the community – who are missing from this map, but who should be included in order to ensure better 
preparedness and response in future?  
Part 2 - Issues arising during each of the three phases of the public 
health event 
Anticipation phase (prior to the event) 
3.  Has your institution produced any protocols, guidelines, or information leaflets for the population regarding the 
prevention of tick-borne diseases? [Obtain copies if possible]  
4.  To what extent were there any sort of public health preparedness activities or simulation exercises, 
consultations, or training activities involving both the community and the administration prior to this case? 
Please describe these. Do you consider these activities to have been (a) necessary, and, if so, (b) sufficient? If 
not, what could have been done in addition? 
5.  [For national level respondents] In general, do you think that the community trusted the public health and 
scientific administration prior to the event? [For autonomous community level respondents] In general, do you 
think that the community trusted the public health & scientific administration in Castilla y León and Madrid 
Autonomous Community prior to the event? [For all respondents] Had there been any specific events (such as 
other disease outbreaks) that promoted or undermined trust? Details. 
Response phase (during the event) 
6.  [For national level respondents] Were there sufficient numbers of dedicated professional staff, able to respond 
to the case? [For autonomous community-level respondents] Were there sufficient numbers of dedicated 
professional staff in Castilla y León and Madrid Autonomous Community able to respond to the case? [For all 
respondents] Were there any problems, for example with funding, that may have limited the response?   
7.  Was there any official guidance for the administration on how to engage with the community in this case(s)? 
What form did this guidance take? 
8.  Were the key actors in the community clearly identified and available when the case(s) first appeared? To what 
extent was there clarity about who was expected to do what?  
9.  What were people’s sources of information about the event (i.e. press and social media etc.)? How informative, 
coherent and consistent were these sources of information? Were there any issues that you think people felt 
they needed to know more about? 
10. How was the communication and coordination between the community and the administration during the 
response to this event? [i.e. shared/transparent/top-down?]. Were there any aspects that could have been 
improved? 
11. To what extent do you think different groups who could have been at risk within the community (e.g. hunters, 
farmers, mountaineers and hikers) cooperated with each other during the response to this event? Examples? 
12. Do you think there were any groups in the community who, for any reason, were excluded from the response? 
Details.  
Synergies in community and institutional public health emergency preparedness for tick-borne diseases in Spain  TECHNICAL REPORT 
24 
13. Were there any hard-to-reach or vulnerable groups [Probe: for example, undocumented migrants working on 
farms]? What efforts, if any, were made to reach out to them with information about prevention and, if 
necessary, treatment-seeking behaviour? Who led these efforts, and what lessons could be learned from this? 
Recovery phase (after the event/ outbreak) 
14. Was there any sort of post-case review of the event, specifically with reference to the ways in which the 
community and the administration communicated and collaborated together? If so, what form did the review 
take, who was involved, and what was the outcome?  
15. How much awareness do you think there currently is in the community about this event? Do you think that 
lessons have been learned by the community regarding prevention and response practices for future events of 
this nature? 
Part 3 - Overview 
16. Overall, how would you rate (i) the community response and (ii) the official response to the event? Were you 
satisfied, or do you think some aspects could have been improved? 
17. [Only for Autonomous Community-level respondents] In general, how do you feel the community and the 
administration collaborated during this event? What would you say was the most successful aspect of any 
collaboration? What were the main challenges faced in the collaboration process, and what efforts, if any, were 
made to overcome these? 
18. What do you think are the main lessons learned from this event, in terms of community-institutional 
collaboration and preparing for future public health emergencies or events? 
19. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
Focus group discussion questions for representatives of 
different interest groups within the community 
Part 1 - Mapping the different stakeholders 
1. Could you map out on a piece of paper (a) the different stakeholder/interest groups or groups that have 
previously been involved with preparing for tick-borne diseases, and (b) those that were involved in responding 
to the 2016 Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) cases. Which of these would you define as coming 
from the community, and which would you define as “Administration”? Do you think there are any 
stakeholder/interest groups – institutional or from the community – who are missing from this map, but who 
should be included in order to ensure a better response?  
Part 2 - Issues arising during each of the three phases of the public 
health event 
Anticipation phase (prior to the event) 
2. Public health preparedness exercises are sometimes held in order to raise awareness of a particular public 
health problem among the different groups of people who may be affected, or who may be part of any 
response activities.  
a) Are you aware of any sort of public health preparedness or simulation exercises or training activities that 
your interest group (hunters, farmers, hikers etc.) has participated in, either on tick-borne diseases or on 
any other health threats?  
b) If so, do you consider the activities to have been useful? Why/why not? Is there any way that they could 
have been improved to make them more useful for you?   
c) If not, do you consider that public health preparedness exercises would, in principle, be useful? Do you 
think that people would be interested and available to participate? 
3. In general, do you think that the community, and in particular your own interest group, trusted the public 
health & scientific administration in Castilla y León/Madrid prior to the event? Had there been any specific 
events (such as other disease outbreaks) that promoted or undermined trust? Details. 
Response phase (during the event) 
4. Were the key actors in the community, and in your own interest group, clearly identified and available when the 
CCHF case first appeared? To what extent was there clarity about who was expected to do what?  
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5. From where did people in your interest group receive information about the event (i.e. press and social media 
etc.)? How informative, coherent and consistent were these sources of information? Were there any issues that 
you think people felt they needed to know more about? 
6. How was the communication and coordination between people in your interest group and the administration 
during the response to this event? [i.e. shared/democratic/top-down?]. Were there any aspects that could have 
been improved? 
7. To what extent did different interest groups cooperate with each other during the response to this event? 
Examples? 
8. Do you think there were any groups in the community who, for any reason, were excluded from the response, 
but who should have been included? Details.   
9. Were there any hard-to-reach or vulnerable groups [Probe: for example, undocumented migrants working on 
farms]? Are you aware of any efforts that were made to reach out to them with information about prevention 
and, if necessary, treatment-seeking behaviour? Who led these efforts, and what lessons could be learned from 
this?  
Recovery phase (after the event/ outbreak) 
10.  Was there any sort of post-case review of the event, specifically with reference to the ways in which different 
interest groups and the administration communicated and collaborated together? If so, what form did this 
review take, who was involved, and what was the outcome?  
11.  How much awareness do you think there currently is within your interest group about this event? Do you 
think that lessons have been learned by your interest group regarding prevention and response practices for 
future events of this nature?  
Part 3 - Overview 
12.  Overall, how would you rate (i) the response of your own interest group and (ii) the official response to the 
event? Were you satisfied, or do you think some aspects could have been improved? 
13.  In general, how do you feel your interest group and the administration collaborated during this event? What 
would you say was the most successful aspect of any collaboration? What were the main challenges faced in 
the collaboration process, and what efforts, if any, were made to overcome these? 
14. What do you think are the main lessons learned from this event, in terms of community-institutional 
collaboration and preparing for future public health emergencies or events? 
15.  Is there anything else you would like to add? 
ECDC is committed to ensuring the transparency and independence of its work
In accordance with the Staff Regulations for Officials and Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union and the 
ECDC Independence Policy, ECDC staff members shall not, in the performance of their duties, deal with a matter in which, directly or 
indirectly, they have any personal interest such as to impair their independence. Declarations of interest must be received from any 
prospective contractor(s) before any contract can be awarded.
www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/aboutus/transparency
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